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Unequal Burdens in EITC Compliance
Karie Davis-Nozemackt
Lower income means harsher treatment from the government
for taxpayers who claim the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
EITC claimants are audited more often than any taxpayers other
than the very wealthy. More concerning, however, is that the IRS
audits EITC claimants by correspondence examination in a
manner that unduly burdens access to this refundable tax credit:
a credit that often keeps lower income workers out of poverty.
Improper payment law brings increased scrutiny to federal
programs that issue erroneous payments. Because the EITC is
alleged to have substantial improper payments, it is subject to
federal improper payment law, which adds administrative burdens
in hopes of diminishing erroneous payments. While other scholars
have noted the relationship between improper payment law and
the EITC, this Article takes the unique view that improper
payment law, instead of burdening EITC administration, can
provide relief to the Service's onerous EITC compliance methods.
Introduction
For the last three decades, income disparity within the U.S.
has been widening.' After the Occupy Wall Street protests, the
nation is undoubtedly conscious of this growing disparity.2 It is
unlikely, however, that the nation is conscious of the compliance
burden disparity experienced by low and moderate income
taxpayers. For taxpayers claiming the EITC, lower income brings
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the Emory Law School's Critical Tax Policy Conference, the participants of the
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1. See David J. Lynch, Growing Income Gap May Leave US Vulnerable,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2011 11:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-
13/growing-income-divide-may-increase-u-s-vulnerability-to-financial-crises.htmI
(referencing Census Bureau Data that indicates "[slince 1980 about five percent of




with it harsher treatment by the government.'
In chasing increased efficiency while broadening audit
coverage, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) has dramatically
increased its use of correspondence examinations, nearly tripling
their usage since FY 2000.' While sophisticated taxpayers with
representation can navigate correspondence examinations with
minimal difficulty,' in EOTC examinations, ninety-eight percent
of taxpayers are unrepresented.' Moreover, successful application
for EITC is often complex and can require atypical documentation
for nontraditional family living arrangements.! This would make
EITC compliance ill-suited for the correspondence examination
process and results in the Service's declarations of ineligibility for
eligible EITC claimants.! The Service has struggled to
3. See Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government
Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 WIs. L. REV. 461, 461
(2003).
4. Compare IRS, IRS DATA BOOK 2000 42 (2000), with IRS, IRS DATA BOOK
2010 tbl. 9a (2010) (comparing FY 2000 vs. FY 2010 correspondence activity); see
also Mike Landsmann, Campus Correspondence Audit Process & Resolution, slide
4 (Jul. 14, 2010) (graphing the rise in correspondence examinations) (on file with
author).
5. See Leslie Book, The IRS's EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in
the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351, 390 (2002) [hereinafter Compliance Regime] ("[Wihile
the Service's middle-income constituency would be able to tackle these tasks, it
provides a formidable obstacle for low-income taxpayers.").
6.See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
VOLUME Two, at 102 (2007) ("The findings are based on a dataset containing
427,807 taxpayers. Of these returns only 7,688 (1.8%) were represented in the
original audit.").
7. See Book, Compliance Regime, supra note 5, at 369-72, 390-406 (noting
complexity as a reason for EITC errors and discussing special circumstances of the
working poor and specific barriers to effective EITC compliance action); see also
Taxpayer Advocate Report and Low-Income Taxpayer Clinic Program: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 4-
5 (2001) (written statement of Janet Spragens, Professor of Law and Director,
Federal Tax Clinic, Washington College of Law, American University) (examining
documentation challenges that EITC taxpayers face).
8. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
VOLUME TWO, at i:
[This study confirms what many low income taxpayer
advocates have maintained for many years - that the manner in
which the IRS conducts its audits of low income taxpayers
impacts the audit outcomes. One can infer from the study that
in many cases - 43 percent of 67,000 FY 2002 audit
reconsiderations, or over 28,000 cases - taxpayers were entitled
to virtually all of the EITC they claimed. That is, their original
audit results did not accurately reflect their eligibility for the
EITC. Rather, the audits merely show that the taxpayer




successfully administer EITC for thirty years;' however, seeking
EITC compliance under the correspondence examination
procedures is not a good answer. Administering the EITC in this
manner burdens benefit distribution to low-income taxpayers.'o
This is particularly true when the Service fails to offer basic
support services for EITC correspondence exams. For example,
the Service only answers approximately seventy percent of
taxpayer phone calls it receives." Callers to the EITC phone line
may find a phone line that is not staffed, and for those who leave a
voicemail message, anecdotal evidence suggests that they may not
receive a return phone call." While this is frustrating and
undoubtedly makes navigating the credit more difficult, perhaps it
is fortuitous that taxpayer needs are not adequately addressed by
phone; correspondence examination cases are only assigned to an
examiner after correspondence is received from a taxpayer."
Accordingly, the taxpayer must correspond in writing with the
Service to extricate himself or herself from an otherwise wholly
automated system." Unfortunately, even if an EITC taxpayer
writes the Service, the correspondence may be lost, incorrectly
matched, or experience significant delay before it is logged into the
Service's system, which could trigger the automated system to
send inaccurate correspondence in response." An EITC taxpayer
facing examination may experience some or all of these barriers
before even attempting to provide the required document-intensive
proof to verify his or her entitlement to the credit.
Adding another layer of challenge to EITC administration is
that EITC has been branded as a social benefit riddled with
fraud." The Service reports,"' between twenty-three and twenty-
9. See Gene Steuerle, Economic Perspective: Research Required for the EITC
Precertification Process, 100 TAX NOTES 259, 259 (2003) (articulating that, even
though the Service has administered the EITC since 1975, it still lacks knowledge
about, and research to substantiate, its successes and failures).
10. See infra pp. 55-61.
11. See IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, FISCAL YEAR 2012 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
BUDGET RECOMMENDATION SPECIAL REPORT 4 (2011).
12. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
VOLUME Two, at 102 (2007).
13. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slide 13 (depicting that cases with no
response are worked completely through an automated system).
14. See id.
15. See Joe B. Marchbein, Managing an IRS Correspondence Audit, J. ACCT.,
Aug. 2011, http://www.journalofaccountancy.comIssues/2011/Aug/20114142.htm.
16. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 4.19.14.5.5, 4.19.14.5.7 (last visited Oct.
27, 2012).
17. See Anne Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2080 (1996) ("[I]n recent years the
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eight percent of EITC payments are improperly made.19 This
report is likely inaccurate,20 but it forms the basis of subjecting
EITC to heightened scrutiny under federal improper payment
laws.1 While other commentators have noted the effect of
improper payment laws on aspects of the EITC,2 this Article
takes the unique view that improper payment law, instead of
burdening EITC administration, could provide relief to the
Service's onerous EITC compliance methods.
EITC has been widely criticized as a program 'rife with fraud."' (citing Anne L.
Alstott, Comments on Samansky, Tax Policy and the Obligation to Support
Children, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 381, 390-91 (1996))); James Bovard, Clinton's Biggest
Welfare Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1994, at Al8; Lisa Schiffren, America's Best-
Kept Welfare Secret, AM. SPECTATOR, Apr. 1995, at 24)); see also Dorothy Brown,
The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but Unequal, 54 EMORY L. J. 755, 779-80,
n.111, n.112 (2005) [hereinafter Separate but Unequal] ("[T]he assumption has
often been made that errors on EITC returns are the result of fraud" (citing Leslie
Book, EITC Noncompliance: What We Don't Know Can Hurt Them, 99 TAx NOTES
1821, 1823 (2003) ("[A]t the center of the debate on the Initiative is the belief that
the EITC is riddled with taxpayer cheating."))).
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 281 app. B (2010).
19. See Recent Efforts to Address Improper Payments and Remaining
Challenges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Org., Efficiency, and Finan.
Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. 7 (2011)
(written statement of Kay L. Daly, Director, Financial Management & Assurance,
GAO) [hereinafter Daly Statement].
An improper payment is defined as any payment that should
not have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount
(including overpayments and underpayments) under statutory,
contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable
requirements. It includes any payment to an ineligible
recipient, any payment for an ineligible service, any duplicate
payment, payment for services not received, and any payment
that does not account for credit for applicable discounts. Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance also instructs
agencies to report payments for which insufficient or no
documentation was found as improper payments.
Id.
20. See infra text pp. 70-71.
21. Improper payment laws, discussed in infra Part I, are designed to limit the
federal government from wrongly paying third parties.
22. See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1896-98 (2005) (articulating that the
EITC is the only Service program identified as susceptible to improper payments
and for which OMB has requested improper payment information and that
improper refunds of withholding and estimated payments should be similarly
subject to IPIA requirements); Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An
Applied Perspective, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (2007) [hereinafter Freakonomics]
(noting the EITC's error rate in comparison with the error rates of other benefits
programs and citing to the IPIA); Dorothy Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax
Policy, 107 COLUM. LAW REV. 790, 806 (2007) [hereinafter Race and Class]
(highlighting that "[t]he EITC is the only tax provision about which the OMB has
requested improper payment information").
UNEQUAL BURDENS
Executive Order 13520 contributes to the landscape of federal
improper payment law, but it could provide relief to EITC and its
claimants. Executive Order 13520 requires federal agencies with
programs representing the highest improper payments to submit
plans to reduce these improper payments, but the plans may not
"unduly [burden] program access and participation by eligible
beneficiaries."23 Correspondence examinations, and more
specifically the manner in which they are conducted, unduly
burden access to EITC, and this contravenes the Executive Order
13520 requirement to refrain from an undue burden for program
access. This Article is divided into six Parts to address the
collision of EITC and the correspondence examination process with
Executive Order 13520 and its kindred improper payment laws.
In Part I, this Article discusses improper payment laws, including
Executive Order 13520. Part II identifies the alleged EITC
overpayment rate and comments on the trigger of improper
payment program requirements. Part II also highlights the fact
that EITC is the only Department of Treasury or Service program
subject to such scrutiny, even though EITC comprises only five
percent of the tax gap.24 Part III discusses how the Service
executes its compliance mission and function via the
correspondence examination process, and Part IV offers evidence
that the correspondence examination process often impedes
legitimate claimant access to EITC. Part V concludes that the
Service's use of correspondence examinations unduly burdens
access to EITC in contravention of Executive Order 13520.
Finally, in Part VI, the Article examines possible solutions,
including previous and current Service Pilot projects.
I. Accountability Via Improper Payment Law
The U.S. faces burgeoning spending, debt levels, and lower
revenue receipts due, at least in part, to the recent recession and
sluggish national growth.25 In addition, there is heightened
23. See Exec. Order No. 13520, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,201-05 (Nov. 20, 2009).
24. The tax gap is the difference between projected revenue and the amount
collected. See JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RES. SERV., R42739, TAx GAP, TAX
ENFORCEMENT, AND TAx COMPLIANCE PROPOSALS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 3-5
(2012).
25. See Catherine Rampell, Sure Cure for the Debt Problem: Economic Growth,
N. Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011, at BU1 ("We face the largest budget deficit the nation
has ever known: $1.6 trillion, the equivalent of about 11 percent of our economy.
And, whatever Washington does, many economists say the situation will grow only
worse, particularly as Americans age and Medicare costs spiral higher."); see also
Harry Bradford, U.S. Economy Surpasses Pre-Recession Level After 45 Months,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
4120121
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political rhetoric calling, in many cases, for smaller government
and, at the very least, more efficient government.26 One way to
control spending and to reform governmental administration is to
closely monitor and control governmental payments to third
parties.
It is not difficult to find political support for limiting and
monitoring improper payments by the federal government.27  en
couched in terms of merely requiring the federal government to
properly execute its duties and refrain from abetting activities
that sound like fraud, improper payment legislation garners near
unanimous support.28 Congress passed and the president signed
improper payment legislation in 2002 and 2010.29 President
Obama added more processes to the minimization of improper
payments with Executive Order 13520 in 2009 and two
presidential memoranda in 2010.30 This legislation and
manifestation of executive administrative power creates a more
systematic framework for improper payment identification,
measurement, planning, and reporting. What follows is a brief
overview of the legislative and presidential contributions to
improper payment law. While each offers contribution to the
improper payment landscape, it is Executive Order 13520 that
provides the possible opportunity for change in EITC compliance.
2011/10/28/us-gdp-growth-us-economy-surpasses-pre-recession-level-45-
months n_1064016.html (reporting on recession and U.S. economic growth levels).
26. See Brent Cebul, Government, Big or Small, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/23/opinion/la-oe-cebul-smaller-govt-20120123
(noting President Obama's rhetoric promising smaller, more efficient government);
see also Mitt Romney, Address at the Detroit Economic Club (Feb. 21, 2012),
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 24, 2012, available at http://www.freep.com/article/
20120224/NEWS15/120224034/Text-of-Mitt-Romney-s-speech-to-the-Detroit-
Economic-Club ("By making bold cuts in spending and commonsense entitlement
reforms, we will make our government simpler, smaller, and smarter . . . .
Together, let's put America on the path toward more jobs, less debt, and smaller
government.").
27. See GARRETT HATCH & VIRGINIA A. MCMURTRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34164, IMPROPER PAYMENTS INFORMATION ACT OF 2002: BACKGROUND,
IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENT 25 (2010).
28. Id.
29. See Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-300, 116
Stat. 2350 (2002); Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-204, 124 Stat. 2224 (2010).
30. See Presidential Memorandum, Finding and Recapturing Improper
Payments, 75 Fed. Reg. 12,119-29 (2010) [hereinafter Finding and Recapturing];
Presidential Memorandum, Enhancing Payment Accuracy Through a 'Do Not Pay
List', 75 Fed. Reg. 35,953 (2010) [hereinafter Enhancing Payment Accuracy].
[Vol. 31:3742
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A. Improper Payments Act of 2002
Prior to the passage of the Improper Payments Act of 2002
(IPIA), there was no universal federal agency requirement to
report or analyze wrongly made payments by the federal
government." The IPIA began the process by requiring executive
branch agencies "to review annually all programs and activities
they administer and identify those which may be susceptible to
significant erroneous payments."32 A program is at "significant"
risk with $10 million of improper payments.". If an agency has
improper payments greater than the $10 million trigger IPIA
requires the agency to estimate annual improper payments and
report on its actions for reducing these improper payment
34
estimates.
To comply with IPIA, federal agencies typically report their
findings in their agency performance and accountability reports
(PARs), annual financial reports (AFRs), or annual reports." The
IPIA's process and reporting demands have, at the very least,
allowed the federal government to have an increasingly
comprehensive picture of the universe of improper payments."6 It
appears that the IPIA's effect has not been short lived. Every year
since IPIA was implemented in 2004, federal agencies have
consistently identified new programs or activities as risk-
susceptible and reported estimated improper payment amounts.37
IPIA and its implementation were not without their critics.
After its passage, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
issued guidance for agencies implementing the IPIA." In its
guidance, the OMB augmented the IPIA's statutory requirements.
The guidance departed from the express IPIA provisions in two
31. See HATCH & MCMURTRY, supra note 27, at 1.
32. See MITCHELL E. DANIELS, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, IMPROPER PAYMENTS INFORMATION ACT OF 2002 P.L. 107-300, at 2
(2003).
33. Id.
34. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATUS OF FISCAL YEAR 2010 FEDERAL
IMPROPER PAYMENTS REPORTING 2 (2011).
35. See JACOB LEW, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ISSUANCE OF REVISED PARTS I AND II TO APPENDIX C OF OMB CIRCULAR A-123, at 3
(2011).
36. See PAYMENT ACCURACY, http://paymentaccuracy.gov.about-improper-
payments (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) (commenting on the progress on improper
payments); see also HIGH-ERROR PROGRAMS, http://paymentaccuracy.gov/high-
priority-programs (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) (containing a list of the federal
programs with the highest error rates.).
37. See HIGH-ERROR PROGRAMS, supra note 36.
38. See DANIELS, supra note 32, at 13. Additional IPIA guidance was revised
and incorporated into OMB Circular A-123, Appendix C. Id. at 14.
2012]1 43
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ways: dollar amount trigger and timing of reporting. 9 Whereas
IPIA requires reporting programs with improper payments
exceeding $10 million, OMB guidance states that reporting is only
required for programs meeting the $10 million threshold and
improper payments amounting to at least 2.5% of total program
payments.40 Critics noted that the addition of the 2.5% threshold
exempted a number of programs from IPIA requirements that
would have met the statutory trigger. OMB guidance also faced
criticism because it enabled programs with substantial improper
payments, so long as they were under the technical thresholds to
avoid risk assessment planning with regard to improper
payments, which, of course, defeated the purpose of the
legislation.4
In other words, critics suggested that there was too little
process when an agency's improper payments were less than $10
million and 2.5%. OMB guidance went even further by
augmenting the IPIA reporting time periods. IPIA required
annual reporting; however, OMB guidance allowed for reporting
every three years for "low risk" programs.' While OMB's guidance
drew criticism, OMB was somewhat vindicated when the Improper
Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) codified
OMB guidance."
B. Executive Order 13520 & Subsequent Presidential
Memoranda
While the IPIA served to highlight the problem of agency
improper payments to federal agencies and the public, the law
itself, as well as OMB's guidance, failed to capture significant
improper payments in the processes and provided only a very basic
framework for agency consideration of these payments. In late
2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 13520 to extend
the IPIA by providing more processes for reporting on improper
payments. Specifically, Executive Order 13520 requires:
* OMB to identify federal programs with the highest
improper payments;
* OMB to set reduction targets for those programs, and
39. Id.
40. See HATCH & MCMURTRY, supra note 27, at 3.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 4.
43. See id. at 14.
44. Id. at 25.
45. Exec. Order No. 13520, supra note 23, at §§1, 3 (emphasis added).
44 [Vol. 31:37
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Agencies to designate an official accountable for meeting
the OMB reduction targets "without unduly burdening
program access and participation by eligible
beneficiaries,";
* Agencies to report to their inspector generals regarding
measuring improper payments and the agency's plan to
meet the reduction targets without unduly burdening
program access."
It should be noted that Executive Order 13520 has a different
trigger than the IPIA. Under Executive Order 13520, an agency's
"highest" improper payments trigger the process, as opposed to the
IPIA's dollar and percentage triggers. Because Executive Order
13520 does not change the IPIA and only adds another layer of
process, its trigger subjects more agencies and programs to
improper payment law.
Most significant for the purposes of this Article, however, is
Executive Order 13520's recognition that an agency should not
minimize improper payments in manners that unduly burden
beneficiary access to, and participation in, federal programs. This
requirement was missing from both the IPIA and also the later
IPERA.
In addition to Executive Order 13520, President Obama also
issued two presidential memoranda aimed at reducing improper
payments. On March 10, 2010, the President issued Memorandum
on Finding and Recapturing Improper Payments, which expanded
the use of payment recapture audits.47 On June 18, 2010,
President Obama issued Memorandum on Enhancing Payment
Accuracy Through a "Do Not Pay List," which required federal
agency cross-checking before making payments.
C. Improper Payments Elimination & Recovery Act of 2010
The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of
2010 (IPERA). codified some of OMB's extra-statutory IPIA
guidance."o IPERA also increased process requirements for
identifying, estimating, and reporting improper agency payments,
and added a recovery audit piece as well as consequences for
agency noncompliance." Most significantly, IPERA requires the
46. See id. at 62201-02 (emphasis added).
47. See Finding and Recapturing Improper Payments, supra note 30, at 12,119.
48. See Enhancing Payment Accuracy, supra note 30, at 35,953.
49. Pub. L. No. 111-204, 124 Stat. 2224 (2010).
50. See HATCH & MCMURTRY, supra note 27, at 14.
51. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 34, at 8.
2012] 45
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head of each Federal agency to review all the agency's programs
and identify activities that may be susceptible to significant
improper payments ($10 million and 2.5% or $100 million), at least
once every three years." This is the same trigger that OMB
guidance suggested under IPIA." Because IPERA's provisions
became effective in fiscal year 2011, results for measuring its
effectiveness are not yet available.'
D. Applying Improper Payment Law
As explained above, federal improper payment law is drawn
from two federal statutes, an executive order, and two presidential
memoranda, but to what end? Currently, OMB uses these to
require a formal process for decreasing unnecessary and wasteful
expenditures." These procedures certainly create additional work
for federal agencies by requiring new processes as well as
monitoring and reporting. This is new bureaucracy, but it appears
to be working. According to OMB, agencies payout $2-3 trillion
annually to third parties.56 From fiscal year 2009 to 2010, there
was a drop in the improper payment rate from 5.65% to 5.49%,
although the 2010 rate was still above the targeted 5.3% . These
rates do not include the provisions of IPERA, which becomes
effective in fiscal year 2011.
Despite only modest improvements in improper payment
52. See Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-204, §2(a)(1) (2010).
53. See DANIELS, supra note 32, at 4-5.
54. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 34, at 2.
55. See HATCH & MCMURTRY, supra note 27, at 1.
56. See OFF. FED. FINAN. MGMT. IMPROPER PAYMENTS,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/financialfia-improper/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
57. See PAYMENT ACCURACY, supra note 36 The website states:
Improper payments' occur when: funds go to the wrong
recipient; the right recipient receives the incorrect amount of
funds (including overpayments and underpayments).
Documentation is not available to support a payment; or the
recipient uses funds in an improper manner. For 2010, federal
agencies reported a government-wide improper payment rate of
5.49%, a decrease from the 5.65% improper payment rate that
was reported in 2009, but more than the original target of
5.33% established last year. Despite the lower improper
payment rate, due to higher outlays associated with the
economic downturn, improper payments totaled approximately
$125 billion in 2010 - an increase of $15 billion from 2009. For
example, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(formerly known as food stamps), reported that outlays grew




rates, a review of agency annual reports and agency inspector
general reports illustrates that most agencies appear to be publicly
reporting (and perhaps by extension, paying more attention) to the
level of improper payments.' With implementation of IPERA in
progress, the addition of more specific and mandatory processes
should decrease improper payments. It is possible, however, that
these processes could initially have the opposite effect by flagging
previously unknown improper payments. This could, at least
temporarily, increase the number of known improper payments
and give the impression that this improper payment regime is not
successful. 9
II. EITC & Improper Payments
While Part I offered an overview of improper payment law,
Part II will briefly examine the EITC to lay a foundation for
identifying and explaining the alleged level of EITC overpayments.
Significant scholarship examining the EITC is available from a
number of sources."0  Accordingly, this Article only provides
enough EITC information to advance an understanding of the
EITC's intersection with improper payment law.
A. What is the EITC?
The EITC provides a refundable tax credit to low-income
taxpayers.61 A refundable credit is one that not only offsets a
taxpayer's tax liability but can also result in a cash payment in
excess of tax liability.62 EITC increases with the amount of earned
income a taxpayer reports, thereby functioning as an incentive to
work." Its design, as part direct payment and part tax offset, is
58. The Postal Service and the Department of Transportation failed to report
program risk assessments to comply with the provisions of the IPIA for fiscal year
2010. See Daly Statement, supra note 19, at 7.
59. See id.
60. See Zelenak, supra note 22; Leslie Book, Preventing The Hybrid from
Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006
Wis. L. REV. 1103 (2006); Book, Compliance Regime, supra note 5; Book, EITC
Noncompliance, supra note 17; Brown, Separate but Unequal, supra note 17;
Brown, Race and Class, supra note 22; Stephen Holt, Keeping it in Context: Earned
Income Tax Credit Compliance and Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB.
INTEREST L. J. 183 (2007); Lipman, supra note 3.
61. See I.R.C. § 32(a)(1).
62. IRS, PUBLICATION 596: EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT,
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p596/ar01.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
63. Hearing on Improper Payments in the Administration of Refundable Tax
Credits, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th
Cong. (2011) (written statement of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate)
[hereinafter Olson, Ways and Means] (citing Stacy Dickert et al., The Earned
2012]1 47
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consistent with its dual purpose as part social assistance payment
and part work incentive." An attempt to make the EITC serve
dual masters is at least partially responsible for its complex rules
and administration.65
Most EITC claimants must prove, among other things, three
primary items: earned income, relationship of qualifying children,
and minimum residency of qualifying children.' EITC is available
to claimants without children but increases dramatically when a
qualifying child resides with a claimant for more than half of the
tax year.6 ' EITC further increases with the number of "qualifying
children" who reside with the claimant." Prior to 2009, EITC
payments plateaued for claimants with two qualifying children.6 9
In other words, a claimant did not receive any additional EITC for
three (or more) children than for two children. Pursuant to the
Tax Relief Act of 2010, EITC increased for claimants with three
children." The third-child expansion is temporary for two years,
which is in addition to the original two-year expansion under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.n There has
been discussion opining that the previous two-child maximum
created an incentive for larger families to improperly allow others
to claim their other children."
Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs: A Study of Labor Market and Program
Participation, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL. 9 (James M. Poterba ed.,
1995)).
64. See Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1873-75 (depicting EITC as a hybrid tax-
transfer program).
65. See Book, Compliance Regime, supra note 5, at 352 ("The EITC is
excessively complicated in its application. . . .").
66. See I.R.C. § 32(b) (listing the percentages for qualifying children); I.R.C. §
32(c)(2) (defining earned income); I.R.C. § 32(c)(3) (defining qualifying child). For
example, in 2010 a single mother with $24,000 of earned income would be entitled
to an EITC of $3,440 for two qualifying children but only $1,830 with one
qualifying child. EITC plateaus at three children; there is no additional credit for a
fourth qualifying child.
67. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)-(2).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) created the
third child additional amount for tax years 2009 and 2010. See Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (2009). The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization
and Job Creation Act of 2010 extended the additional amount for two more years.
See Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010).
71. For 2011, EITC phases out at $49,078 of income for a married couple with
at least three qualifying children. See IRS, PUBLICATION 596, supra note 62.
72. See Book, Freakonomics, supra note 22, at 1177:
Poverty is more prevalent among larger families, and the EITC's
effectiveness is 'poorly designed to address this pattern of child poverty.'
To address this inequity, low wage workers with more than two children
are tempted to 'share' the benefits with related parties who may have
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B. Consequences for Improperly Claiming the EITC
Like many social assistance programs, the EITC contains
severe penalties for claims made fraudulently, recklessly, or with
intentional disregard." Taxpayers who are found to have
fraudulently claimed the EITC may not receive it for ten years,
even if they are otherwise eligible." EITC claims that are made
recklessly, or with intentional disregard of the rules, render a
taxpayer unable to claim EITC for two years, even if they are
otherwise eligible." Penalties for fraudulent, reckless, or
intentionally improper EITC claims are more severe than
penalties for fraud in other social assistance programs.76 Benefits
under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) may be
denied for an entire family for a month due to noncompliance, and
repeated noncompliance may result in denial for up to six
months." Food stamp programs have similar sanctions. In these
other benefits programs, repeated abuse only garners sanctions for
months, whereas comparable actions garner sanctions lasting
years under EITC.
There are, of course, civil penalties for non-EITC reckless or
fraudulent violations of the Internal Revenue Code." Non-EITC
penalties, however, pale in comparison to the EITC civil penalties,
and they do not bar future use of any code section for which a
taxpayer is otherwise eligible.0 Indeed, with respect to EITC
sanctions, "[t]here are no analogous sanctions applicable to other
improper positions taken on federal income tax returns."'
Penalties for EITC abuse, criminal or civil, are significantly
harsher than sanctions for other tax violations or other social
benefit abuse. These heavier penalties are consistent with the
earned income, but fewer than two qualifying children of their own.
Id. (citing JASON FURMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TAX REFORM AND
POVERTY 4 (2006)); see also Brown, Separate but Unequal, supra note 17, at 789
(2005).
73. See I.R.C. § 32(k) (disallowing EITC for taxpayers making fraudulent and
reckless EITC claims for ten years and two years respectively).
74. I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(i).
75. I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii).
76. See Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1893-85 (comparing EITC sanctions with
those under TANF and food stamps and concluding that "[airguably, the EITC
sanctions are even more severe. ..
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See I.R.C. § 6662-63 (listing accuracy-related and fraud penalties).




impression that EITC is riddled with fraud."
C. Improper EITC Payment Rates
There certainly exists an impression of significant EITC
fraud, and many interpret the government's improper payment
numbers to support this theory." The Treasury Department
estimates total EITC program payments for FY 2010 as $64
billion,' and EITC overpayment rates of twenty-three to twenty-
eight percent or $15-18 billion." The estimated EITC overpayment
rate has remained constant at twenty-three to twenty-eight
percent for several years and is not expected to change through
2013.6 The Service has argued that impending preparer
regulation will shrink the future EITC overpayment rate," but in
examining the Service's expectation, the Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found no evidence to
expect a positive impact on the rate."
The annual EITC overpayment estimate ranks it fourth in
relative size of programs with improper payment estimates.89
When programs administered by state and local agencies with
federal funds are removed and only federally administered
programs are examined, EITC overpayments are the second
82. See supra note 17.
83. See, e.g., David Nolte, IRS is Paying Tens of Billions of Fraudulent
Refundable Tax Credits, BETWEEN THE NUMBERS BLOG (May 31, 2011),
http://betweenthenumbers.net/2011/05/irs-is-paying-tens-of-billions-of-fraudulent-
refmdable-tax-credits/ (assuming erroneously that improper payments are all due
to fraud); Ernest Istook, Congress Will Send Billions To Tax Cheaters, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2008/02/
congress-will-send-billions-to-tax-cheaters (attributing all EITC improper
payments to "fraud" by "cheaters" filing "phony" returns).
84. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, supra note 18, at 278 app. B.
85. See id.; see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REDUCTION
TARGETS AND STRATEGIES HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE THE BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS IN IMPROPER EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PAYMENTS EACH YEAR 3
(2011) [hereinafter REDUCTION TARGETS].
86. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, supra note 18, at 278 app. B. While Treasury expects EITC outlays to
remain flat for FY 2011, Treasury expects total outlays to shrink to $58 billion for
FY 2012 and FY 2013. Id.
87. Other scholars have noted the possibility of reduced improper payment
rates with preparer regulation. See Brown, Separate but Unequal, supra note 17,
at 781 n.120 ("One study suggests that regulating certain tax preparers could
decrease the EITC error rate from 30% to 18%." (citing Lipman, supra note 3, at
494)).
88. See REDUCTION TARGETS., supra note 85, at 335-37 app. D.
89. See Daly Statement, supra note 19, at 4.
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highest federal program overpayments."o EITC's ranking as one of
the "highest dollar value" of government-wide improper payments
triggers the application of Executive Order 13520's required
reduction targets and planning. IPIA and IPERA designation as a
"susceptible program" is triggered, not by the EITC overpayment
relative ranking against other federal program overpayments, but
by passing the established thresholds of $10 million of improper
payments and 2.5% of program outlays, or at least $100 million in
improper payments." Designation under IPERA obligates an
agency to perform risk assessments and report on plans to meet
"measurable milestones.",
The Department of the Treasury's FY 2010 Performance and
Accountability Report found EITC to be the only high-risk
susceptible program under IPIA." That same report identified
EITC as the only high priority program under Executive Order
13520.94 This is strange, particularly considering that EITC
overpayments are estimated to be only five percent of the tax
gap.9' In contrast, twenty percent of the tax gap (four times the
EITC overpayment amount) is attributable to underreported self-
employment income. ' Between ten and fifteen times the EITC
overpayment amount is attributable to misreported business
income." Commentators have also identified other tax credits that
likely meet IPERA designation, including alternative fuel credits,"
and research credits.' Others have argued that "improper refunds
of withholding and estimated tax payments" are subject to IPIA as
well." TIGTA estimates that the improper First Time Home
Buyer Credits paid in 2009 and 2010 were hundreds of millions of
90. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAx ADMIN., supra note 85, at 1.
91. See Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-204, 124 Stat. 2224 (2010).
92. Id.
93. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, supra note 18, at 45.
94. Id.
95. See Holt, supra note 60, at 188 (estimating EITC tax gap).
96. Id. (comparing EITC tax gap with underreported self-employment tax gap);
see also Brown, Separate but Unequal, supra note 18, at 776 (noting the tax gap
difference between EITC overpayments and underreported self-employment
income).
97. JOHN WANCHECK & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT OVERPAYMENT AND ERROR ISSUES 4
(2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-5-lltax.pdf.
98. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2012 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO
CONGRESS 9 (2012).
99. Id.
100. See Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1897.
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dollars."' Improper payments at these levels should be subject to
IPERA, at the very least. Other tax payments and preference
items, including tax expenditures, should also be subject to
improper payment law; however, this is beyond the purview of this
Article. 0'
D. The Service's Actions to Combat Improper EITC Payments
In compliance with IPIA, and with TIGTA's mission as the
Inspector General of the Service," TIGTA regularly audits the
Service's functions, including the administration of EITC and
overpayments."' In its February 2011 report, TIGTA identified
some of the Service's EITC administrative efforts and
shortcomings."1' TIGTA noted that the Service had failed to
establish reduction targets and strategies for reducing EITC
overpayments." In response, the Service defended itself with the
actions it takes to reduce improper payments."o7  The Service's
defense relied almost exclusively on its return preparer initiative
and identified it as its most promising avenue."' TIGTA did note,
however, that the Service has undertaken a variety of education
and public relations activities to assist participation by eligible
101. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE FACEs SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES IN VERIFYING ELIGIBILITY FOR THE FIRST-
TIME HOMEBUYER 4 (2009); see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN.,
ADMINISTRATION OF THE FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER CREDIT INDICATES A NEED FOR
IMPROVED CONTROLS OVER REFUNDABLE CREDITS 26 (2011) [hereinafter NEED FOR
IMPROVED CONTROLS].
102. See Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1896-98 (asserting that the EITC is the sole
Service program identified under the IPIA and noting that, for the purposes of
improper payment law, EITC is treated like TANF and food stamp overpayments
and unlike income tax overpayments); see also Brown Race and Class, supra note
22, at 806-07 (acknowledging that EITC is the "only tax provision about which the
OMB has requested improper payment information," and speculating that "[tihe
belief that EITC errors are the result of fraud and not complexity is a function of
the mental connection between EITC recipients and welfare recipients").
103. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS
2009-2014, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/about/
tigta.strategic-plan.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
104. See REDUCTION TARGETS, supra note 85; TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR
TAX ADMIN., ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE IDENTIFICATION OF TAX
RETURN PREPARERS WHO SUBMIT IMPROPER EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT CLAIMS
(2010) [hereinafter ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN]; TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX
ADMIN., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PROGRAM HAS MADE ADVANCES;
HOWEVER, ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE METHODS ARE NEEDED TO
STOP BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN ERRONEOUS PAYMENTS (2008) [hereinafter PROGRAM
HAS MADE ADVANCES].
105. See REDUCTION TARGETS, supra note 85, at 1.




individuals." The responses of both TIGTA and the Service fail to
acknowledge the power and process the Service undertakes to
administer and police EITC. Their responses belie the Service's
toolbox, which includes the use of correspondence exams, math
error authority, and civiland preparer penalties.
III. Managing EITC with Correspondence Examinations
In Part II, this Article identified the alleged level of EITC
overpayments. Part III attempts to explain the process that
identifies the alleged improper payments: the correspondence
examination process. This Part will explain how returns are
selected for examination, as well as how often and why the Service
utilizes correspondence examinations to audit EITC taxpayers.
A. Return Selection for Correspondence Examination
The Service executes its taxpayer compliance function with
the examination process."' Typically, the Service utilizes a
correspondence examination, office examination, or a field
examination,"' which involve escalating degrees of Service
personnel involvement. With a limited budget and personnel, "the
Service uses sophisticated computer technology and the
accumulated experience of its personnel in the classification and
selection of returns" with the greatest potential for tax change and
revenue yield for examination."' Returns are chosen for audit by
computer analysis that "numerically scores tax returns according
to a mathematically determined probability of error.""'
The Service has recently placed an emphasis on honing EITC
audit selection, "spen[ding] millions of dollars developing
probability filters to improve its selection of cases for audit using
information contained in the Dependent Database.""' The Service
109. Id.
110. See MICHAEL SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 8-5 (2d ed. 2002).
111. See Book, Compliance Regime, supra note 5, at 375 ("The most common
types of examinations are those conducted at a taxpayer's place of business, at an
IRS office, or by correspondence.").
112. See SALTZMAN, supra note 110, at 8-4.
113. Id.
114. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAx ADMIN., REDUCTION TARGETS AND
STRATEGIES HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN
IMPROPER EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PAYMENTS EACH YEAR 4 (2011)
("Probability filters are characteristics of noncompliance the IRS has developed
using historical data and are used to determine the likelihood that an EITC claim
is erroneous. The Dependent Database is a risk-based audit selection tool used by
the IRS to identify EITC tax returns for audit.").
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also uses prior audit information to inform its audit selection."'
Recently, the Service has increasingly used third-party
information from non-Service sources, including the Federal Case
Registry, which is a database of custody orders for children
receiving public assistance and custody orders from some private
divorce cases, as well as information from the Social Security
Administration databases to validate social security numbers and
parents' names for qualifying children."6 TIGTA believes that the
Service is leveraging this technology to identify EITC improper
payments."' Even with all of these investments into EITC error
detectors, the Service has made virtually no progress in limiting
the EITC improper payments."" As previously stated,
overpayment rates are alleged to have hovered between twenty-
three percent and thirty percent for years and are predicted to
remain at the same level for several more years."' Other than
some educational public relations activities and the impending
regulation of preparers, the Service has not committed to any new
plans for reducing the EITC improper payment rate.120 It appears
that the Service intends to continue using correspondence
examinations as the primary compliance tool for EITC
administration.
B. Why Use Correspondence Examinations?
No doubt a primary driver for the Service's choice of
correspondence examinations to manage EITC claims is the low
cost. Correspondence exams are less expensive because they are
more automated, requiring less personnel labor than office or field
examinations.121 The Service estimates that its administration of
EITC costs less than one percent of benefits distributed. 122The
115. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slides 10, 11 (on file with the author).
116. Id.
117. PROGRAM HAS MADE ADVANCES, supra note 104, at 22.
118. Id.
119. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, supra note 18, at 281 app. B.
120. See REDUCTION TARGETS, supra note 85, at 14-15.
121. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., Ref. No. 2011-30-016,
PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TO REENGINEER THE EXAMINATION PROGRAM, BUT
ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE TAXPAYER BURDEN 1 (2011)
("In contrast to the more labor-intensive, face-to-face examination, the
correspondence examination process is . . . more automated," and "correspondence
examinations also enable the IRS to reach more taxpayers at a lower cost . . ..
[hereinafter PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE].
122. IRS, IRS EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT INITIATIVES, ADDENDUM TO THE
REPORT ON QUALIFYING CHILD RESIDENCY CERTIFICATION, FILING STATUS, AND
AUTOMATED UNDERREPORTED TESTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE
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Service contrasts its EITC costs with the cost estimate of other
social assistance program, which are nearlytwenty percent of
benefits distributed.'" Ironically, the alleged overpayments of
twenty-three to twenty-eight percent are strikingly similar to the
twenty percent administrative cost of benefits, making the real
cost of administration of EITC comparable to other social
assistance programs targeting the poor.
EITC administration is kept at this low one percent cost by
burdening the beneficiaries with administration costs. 125  The
EITC process leaves beneficiaries on their own to determine
121
eligibility via the self-assessment process. Scholars and
practitioners have noted that the complexity of claiming the EITC
is overwhelming.'27 Indeed, completing a return with an EITC
claim is "more challenging than completing a Form 1040 with
itemized deductions."2
Although some Service tools are available to help EITC
claimants, most are underutilized. The Service has an Internet
APPROACHES TO IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EITC 2 (2008)
[hereinafter EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT INIATIVES].
123. Id.
124. See Olson Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 9.
Current administration costs are less than 1% of benefits
delivered. This is quite different from other non-tax benefits
programs in which administrative costs related to determining
eligibility can range as high as 20% of program expenditures.
For TY 2009, the IRS reports that it paid $55 billion in EITC
claims. If this amount had been paid by another agency that
spent 20 percent of program expenditures verifying eligibility,
the administration costs to the government would have been
$11 billion - nearly 100 percent of the amount of improper
payments that the IRS estimates were made.
Id.
125. See Lipman, supra note 3, at 465 (commenting that EITC claimants
manage the "inconceivable complexity" of the credit by hiring paid tax practitioners
to assist them).
126. The Service offers an online EITC Assistant. IRS, Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC)-Use the EITC Assistant to Find Out if You Should Claim It,
IRS.Gov, (last updated Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/lndividuals/Eamed-
Income-Tax-Credit-%28EITC%29-%E2%80%93--Use-the-EITC-Assistant-to-Find-
Out-if-You-Should-Claim-it.
127. George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery ofBenefits to the Working Poor:
Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y
225, 294 (1994) ("Both the program's eligibility rules and the paperwork necessary
to file a claim are complex, particularly for the typical taxpayer eligible for the
EITC benefit."); see also Brown, Race and Class, supra note 22, at 829 ("Numerous
scholars have described the EITC as complex."); Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax
Compliance, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1145, 1155 (2003).
128. See Lipman, supra note 3, at 464.
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guide to EITC,"' and the Service funds free EITC return
preparation through its Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA)
program.' Very few EITC claimants utilize the free preparation
options. Fewer than two percent of EITC returns are prepared by
VITA sites."'
For most taxpayers, successfully claiming EITC requires
professional assistance.32 For tax year 2009, 57.3% of all
individual returns were prepared by preparers.as Seventy percent
of EITC claimants use preparers.' It is evident that many of the
costs of tax administration are transferred to taxpayers by virtue
of self-assessment and code complexity, which, in many cases,
requires professional assistance. This is certainly true for EITC
administration, and the transfer of the cost for EITC
administration is borne by those least able to afford it.
Experience does not seem to help alleviate the complexity
and professional assistance problem. Recent studies indicate that
changes to the EITC population may contribute to the long-term
ineffectiveness of EITC education and public relations activities
that the Service has undertaken.'' Sixty-one percent of EITC
claimants from 1989 to 2006 claimed EITC for only one or two
years at a time.13' The study indicated that only twenty percent of
EITC claimants used EITC for more than five consecutive years.'7
Accordingly, efforts to educate an ever-changing population are
likely ineffective. Any experience or knowledge which might be
helpful for claiming EITC is likely only useful to a small number of
129. See EITC Assistant, supra note 126.
130. IRS, Free Tax Return Preparation for You by Volunteers, IRS.Gov (last
updated Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=107626,00.html.
131. See ALAN BERUBE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE NEW SAFETY NET:
HOW THE TAx CODE HELPED Low-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES DURING THE EARLY
2000s 1 (2006).
132. See Lipman, supra note 3, at 463 ("Congress has created an extensive anti-
poverty program, which is almost impossible for the targeted families to obtain
without professional assistance because it is too complicated to comprehend and
claim.").
133. IRS, SOI Tax Stats-Tax Stats at a Glance, IRS.Gov (last updated Aug. 22,
2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---Tax-Stats-at-a-Glance.
134. IRS, Earned Income Credit Preparer Due Diligence at IRS Nationwide 2008
National Tax Forum at slide 5 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pubirs-
utl/eitcdue diligence.requirements.pdf.
135. See Indivar Dutta-Gupta, New Research Highlights Importance of EITC for







20121 UNEQUAL BURDENS 57
repeat claimants.
C. Audit Rates and Reasons
With its limited resources for tax administration and
compliance initiatives, the Service often takes the path of least
resistance. In this case, the path of least resistance is auditing the
"easy" returns. For the Service, EITC returns are easy returns:
low-income returns tend to be simple, with fewer items of income
and few, if any, deductions;... EITC claimants rarely respond to
correspondence examination correspondence;"' nearly the entire
process is automated and has limited Service personnel
involvement;... EITC claimants are unlikely to be able to afford or
even secure free representation.14 ' For the Service, EITC returns
are the proverbial low-hanging fruit.
To illustrate the over-emphasis on EITC audits,
commentators often compare EITC and self-employed audits. 142
Auditing self-employed taxpayers would likely yield more revenue
than auditing EITC claimants, given that twenty percent of the
tax gap is attributable to self-employed taxpayers (as opposed to
only five percent of the tax gap attributable to EITC
138. EITC is not available for taxpayers with over $2200 in investment income.
I.R.C. § 32(i)(1).
139. Hearing on the Tax Gap and Tax Shelters Before Sen. Comm. on Fin., 108th
Cong. 17, n.43 (July 21, 2004) (written statement of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer
Advocate) [hereinafter Olson, Sen. Comm. on Fin.] ("Data provided by the EITC
Program Office to TAS for FY 2003 indicate nearly a 40 percent no
response/undeliverable rate for EITC correspondence. The no
response/undeliverable rate including Statutory Notice of Deficiency is fifty-three
percent.").
140. See PROGRAM HAS MADE ADVANCES, supra note 104 at 23.
141. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 6, at 102.
142. Brown, Separate but Unequal, supra note 17, at 776.
[W]hile the IRS estimate of the EITC noncompliance rate is
high, it is not the highest. The IRS estimates that taxes owed
but unpaid by individual and corporate taxpayers is over $100
billion (the "tax gap"). In addition, the IRS states that its
enforcement efforts only resulted in the collection of about 25%
of the tax gap. Underreported income by self-employed
taxpayers was nearly $30 billion of the tax gap. The estimated
tax gap for the EITC exceeded $1 billion. The EITC therefore
represents less than 1% of the tax gap. The IRS estimates that
self-employed individuals generally underreport their income by
64%, and self-employed individuals who operate in a cash
business underreport their income by 89%. Small corporations
and sole proprietors constitute 29% of the tax gap. Thus,
significant noncompliance areas that generate greater revenue
losses than are estimated for the EITC go unaudited.
Id.
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overpayments)." However, examination of self-employed
taxpayers would likely take significant time and personnel
resources to produce revenue, because discovering underreported
income is much more labor-intensive than verifying
documentation provided by an EITC taxpayer.'44 Moreover, it
would be more difficult to audit self-employed taxpayers via
correspondence exams given the alleged levels of underreported
income."' The audit rate for self-employed taxpayers is 1.9%, and
the audit rate for EITC taxpayers is 2.1%,"' which is nearly 10%
higher.
The audit rate for taxpayers with less than $25,000 income is
1.22%, which is significantly higher than the rate for taxpayers
with $25,000-$200,000 of income which is 0.73%-1.00%.117 The
audit rate does not rise to the level that the lowest-income
taxpayers experience until income goes above $200,000.'4
This should not be surprising given the history of resources
specifically earmarked to police the EITC."' Both scholars and
reporters have noted the 1990s compromise between President
Clinton and Congress that resulted in an increase in the Service's
budget by $100 million specifically to audit EITC returns."o The
legacy continued in 2002 when Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill
stated, "[i]f you look at why we're doing a relatively heavy audit of
low-income [taxpayers], it is because we've been directed by the
Congress to examine the devil out of the so-called earned income
tax credit filers."' The overemphasis of EITC audits continues
today. 152
Limited Service resources and congressional will are not the
143. See BICKLEY, supra note 24, at 3-5.
144. Id. at 4. ("Much of the gross tax gap for individual income tax filers is due to
types of unreported income that are difficult to detect.").
145. See id.
146. See IRS, 2011 DATA BOOK 21-25 (2011) (reporting 574,372 of 26,861,559
EITC returns and 278,092 of 14,867,564 non-farm business individual returns).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO
RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH-AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE
130 (2003) (explaining that in 2001, the IRS audit rate of those who applied for
EITC totaled more than eight times that of individuals earning over $100,000).
150. Id. at 132; see also Brown Race and Class, supra note 22, at 797, 808; John
W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition or Enhancement of Intangible
Property: A Populist, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 VA. TAX REV. 273, 293
(2002).
151. See Brown Race and Class, supra note 22, at 807 n.103.




only drivers of high EITC audit rates. Improper payment law
requirements are certainly a driver, as they require the Service to
demonstrate and execute a plan to bring down EITC improper
payments."' Other commentators believe that heavy EITC
compliance initiatives are attributable to the perception that EITC
is "welfare" and the cultural belief that "cheating on one's income
tax [is] ... less seriously wrong than committing welfare fraud." "
Still others have suggested that EITC compliance initiatives may
be driven by "the belief that EITC errors are the result of fraud
[which] is a function of racial stereotyping about EITC
recipients.""' Regardless of why EITC claimants are chosen for
audit, the data demonstrate that they are chosen for
correspondence examinations at a higher rate than comparable
groups of taxpayers
D. An EITC Correspondence Examination
Once an EITC return is selected for audit via scoring, a letter
is generated asking for information or documentation to verify one
or more of the EITC requirements."6 The correspondence typically
requests the EITC claimant to submit documentation to prove
relationship to, or residency of, the qualifying children. 7 A 2010
study by the Taxpayer Advocate Service "TAS" of 400 EITC cases
noted that "[in ninety percent of the cases reviewed, the primary
issue raised by the IRS involved either the Relationship Test or
the Residency Test under the uniform definition of a 'qualifying
child."'" These are the lynchpins in securing EITC, and they
create proof issues during a correspondence examination. These
proof issues are discussed below in Part IV. "
IV. Correspondence Examinations Impede Access to EITC
The previous Part addressed how, why, and how often EITC
claimants are chosen for examination. The following Part will
explore the conduct of EITC correspondence examinations and lay
153. See Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 9 (discussing IRS programs
designed to reduce improper payments to EITC claimants).
154. Zelenak, supra note 22, at 1899 n.142.
155. See Brown, Separate but Unequal, supra note 17, at 780.
156. See PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, supra note 121, at 1.
157. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2012 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 98, at app. VIII-3 nt. 346 (explaining the test to determine
whether a child is a "qualifying child").
158. See id. at app. VIII-3.
159. E.g., Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 13 (describing the
documentation required to show proof).
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a foundation for the ultimate conclusion that the manner in which
EITC correspondence examinations are conducted is unduly
burdensome.
A. Proof for EITC is Document-Intensive
As stated above, the majority of EITC examinations address
the Relationship Test, the Residency Test, or both."o These can be
very challenging to prove, particularly in non-traditional family
arrangements. For example, an aunt caring for a niece must
produce three birth certificates to satisfy the Relationship Test.'
She must produce the niece's birth certificate to document her
parentage as well as the niece's mother's birth certificate and
aunt's birth certificate to demonstrate that they have the requisite
familial relationship.'62 This may be challenging if the mother is
not present in the home. It also may prove challenging for
transient families, particularly those who have been evicted or are
homeless. In addition, the Internal Revenue Manual lists only a
few items that are acceptable documentation to prove
relationship."3
Residency of more than six months of a qualifying child can
be even more challenging to prove, particularly when the Service
only accepts certain documentation." Only copies of records from
160. See Holt, supra note 60, at 197 ("In the EITC Compliance study of Tax Year
1999, nearly 60 percent of the amount improperly claimed involved misapplication
of the qualifying child and filing status rules.").
161. Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 13.
Assume Granduncle claims the EITC with respect to Grandnephew.
Assume further that the IRS questions the claim based on the relationship
requirement. To document his relationship to the qualifying child,
Granduncle may be required to produce his own birth certificate, a birth
certificate for his sibling showing common parents, a birth certificate for
his niece showing that Granduncle's sibling was the niece's parent, and a
birth certificate for Grandnephew showing that the niece was
Grandnephew's mother. That is four birth certificates in all. Depending on
the states in which these four individuals were born and the restrictions
those states impose on who may obtain birth certificates, it may be
extremely time-consuming or even impossible for Granduncle to obtain the
requisite substantiation. As a result, the IRS may deny the claim even
though it was legitimate.
Id.
162. See id.
163. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 4.19.14.5.6 (listing acceptable
documentation to prove relationship to a qualifying child, including "[b]irth
certificates or other official documents of birth[,] [m]arriage certificates that verify
your relationship to the child[1 letter from an authorized adoption agency[,] letter
from the authorized placement agency or applicable court document").
164. Acceptable documentation to prove the residency of a qualifying child
includes:
Photocopies of school (no report cards), medical, childcare provider
60 [Vol. 31:37
UNEQUAL BURDENS
certain places (e.g., schools, medical providers, child care providers
or social service agencies) can be used as acceptable
documentation.'65 While in theory school records should be easily
used to prove residency in the EITC claimant's home, the practice
does not work well. School records document residency during a
school year, which usually runs August-December (five months)
and January-May (five months). Both semesters of a school year
are less than the six months necessary to prove EITC residency,
which is measured on a tax year basis(January through
December).'"
The atypical documentation that claimants often must
submit can prove challenging during correspondence exams for a
number of reasons. The types of documents used to prove the
relationship and residency tests are not the types of documents
that the Service specializes in dealing with, such as W2s, 1099s,
and other returns."' With respect to traditional documentation,
the Service has established processes for data matching and
analysis.'" The Service struggles, however, to data mine atypical
documentation. The Service's struggle to administer the First-
Time Homebuyer Credit (FTHBC) illustrates this point well."'
This program required the Service to consider and examine home
purchase settlement statements-new documentation for the
Service."o The Service also used new Form 5405.1' Unfortunately,
the Service's difficulty in processing settlement statements and
the new Form 5405 led to errors in FTHBC administration that
(provider can't be a relative) or social service records[,] [a] letter on official
letterhead from a school, a health care provider, a social service agency,
placement agency official, employer, Indian tribal official, landlord or
property manager, or a place of worship that shows the name of child's




166. See Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 31 (discussing the IRS
payments for EITC claims in Tax Year 2009).
167. See IRS, INFORMATION REPORTING AND DOCUMENT MATCHING (IRDM)-
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (June 28, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pia/irdm-
pia.pdf.
168. See id.
169. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
Is BEING DEVELOPED TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS WITH FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER
CREDIT REPAYMENT REQUIREMENTS 6-8 (2010) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE
STRATEGY]; TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., ADDITIONAL STEPS ARE
NEEDED TO PREVENT AND RECOVER ERRONEOUS CLAIMS FOR THE FIRST-TIME
HOMEBUYER CREDIT 14-16 (2010).
170. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY, supra note 169, at 3.
171. See NEED FOR IMPROVED CONTROLS, supra note 101, at 4.
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easily could have been discovered through appropriate
processing.12 Moreover, the novelty of these forms hampered the
Service from accepting settlement statements electronically.73
These types of atypical documentation present an even greater
challenge when the production is conducted via automation, as is
the case with EITC correspondence examinations.1 4
B. The Service's Correspondence Issues
EITC claimants selected for audit face difficult proof
burdens;"' however, these difficulties pale in comparison to the
challenges in navigating the EITC examination process itself.16
Simply put, dealing with the Service during a correspondence
examination is difficult.
EITC claimants chosen for audit have virtually no
alternatives to the correspondence exam process: once a claimant
is chosen under the computerized system, the claimant is almost
172. Id. ("[T]he IRS had not developed and implemented examination filters to
identify potentially erroneous claims for the Homebuyer Credit."). TIGTA identified
the following:
Taxpayers claimed Homebuyer Credits although they had not
made home purchases but reportedly would in the future. These
taxpayers listed home acquisition dates on their Forms 5405
that were subsequent to the dates the claims were processed by
the IRS.
Taxpayers claimed Homebuyer Credits for homes for which at
least one other taxpayer also claimed the Credit and the
combined amounts for each address exceeded $8,000.
Some taxpayers claimed Homebuyer Credits for homes
purchased before April 9, 2008, the effective date of the HERA
legislation.
Id. at 4-5.
173. See First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit: Taxpayers' Use of the Credit and
Implementation and Compliance Challenges Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means Subcomm. on Oversight, 111th Cong. 5-6 (2009) (written testimony of
James R. White, GAO); see also Tax Filing Season Update: Current IRS Issues
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (written testimony of Nina
Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) ("[The specific requirements of each revision
of the FTHBC involve enhanced documentation that prevents taxpayers from
electronically filing their tax returns, causing administrative problems for the
IRS.").
174. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slide 13 (on file with author).
175. See Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 14 (describing the effect of
difficult proof burdens on improperly denied claims).
176. See Marchbein, supra note 15 ("For most taxpayers, an examination is
fraught with anxiety, which can only be compounded if correspondence explaining
the taxpayer's position or providing requested information or verification seems not
to have been duly taken into account by the IRS.").
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certain to face a correspondence examination." In 2010, nearly
ninety-seven percent of audited EITC returns were undertaken
with correspondence examination."'7  Under Treasury regulation
301.7605-1, a taxpayer may petition to change the venue, which
could mean changing from a correspondence examination (i.e.,
campus examination) to a face-to-face office examination. 1 79 This
regulation gives the Service the discretion to grant the request
after considering six factors."' Despite the list of factors, "Imlany
IRS service centers take the view that correspondence
examinations will be transferred only in instances of hardship.""'
The ability to take advantage of the very slim opportunity to
transfer from a correspondence examination turns on the
taxpayer's ability to understand the correspondence sufficiently to
find the regulation to transfer, comprehend the availability of the
option, and successfully argue for transfer. "2 Ironically, these are
the precise skills that a taxpayer needs to successfully navigate a
correspondence exam. If the taxpayer lacks these skills to begin
with, there is virtually no chance he or she will successfully argue
for a more navigable and comprehensible examination.
Assuming that a taxpayer is chosen for correspondence
examination, navigation of the process involves successful with the
177. See IRS, 2010 DATA BOOK, supra note 4, at tbl. 9a.
178. Id.
179. Treas. Reg. § 301.7605-1(e) (1993).
180. The Department of Treasury Regulations state:
The Service will consider, on a case-by-case basis, written
requests by taxpayers or their representatives to change the
place that the Service has set for an examination. In
considering these requests, the Service will take into account
the following factors-
(i) The location of the taxpayer's current residence;
(ii) The location of the taxpayer's current principal place of
business;
(iii) The location at which the taxpayer's books, records, and
source documents are maintained;
(iv) The location at which the Service can perform the
examination most efficiently;
(v) The Service resources available at the location to which the
taxpayer has requested a transfer; and
(vi) Other factors that indicate that conducting the examination
at a particular location could pose undue inconvenience to the
taxpayer.
Id.
181. Marchbein, supra note 15.
182. Cf Jonathan P. Schneller et al., The Earned Income Tax Credit, Low-
Income Workers, and the Legal Aid Community, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 177, 178 (2011)
(arguing that the correspondence system is "uniquely challenging to low-income




Service.'" Interpreting the Service's correspondence is not easy for
any taxpayer (nor any practitioner), but it is particularly difficult
for low-income taxpayers who are more likely to have functional
literacy" and financial literacy"' challenges."' The Service's
correspondence suffers from deficiencies in basic readability. The
systems that the Service uses to generate taxpayer correspondence
are admittedly antiquated."' While some EITC correspondence
has been redesigned to address readability issues, many others
have not and continue to appear in the same, unchanged form."
The typeface, layout, and whitespace make it difficult to read old,
unchanged correspondence."' The aesthetics are compounded by
the substantive readability problems. The sentences are complex
and not written in plain language, and worse, the letters use
Service and tax jargon that mean nothing to the average
taxpayer."' In a study of EITC taxpayers, more than seventy
183. The communication process begins with a letter from the Service to the
EITC claimant being audited. Id. at 200.
184. 'Functional literacy' is defined by UNICEF as "the ability to use reading,
writing, and numeracy skills for effective functioning and development of the
individual and the community." U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG.,
EDUCATION FOR ALL GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 158 (2006).
185. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), THE CASE FOR FINANCIAL LITERACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
PROMOTING ACCESS TO FINANCE BY EMPOWERING CONSUMERS 2 (2009) ("Financial
literacy is the combination of consumers'/investors' understanding of financial
products and concepts and their ability and confidence to appreciate financial risks
and opportunities, to make informed choices, to know where to go for help, and to
take other effective actions to improve their financial well-being.").
186. See Book, Compliance Regime, supra note 5, at 396 (discussing literacy
issues with low-income taxpayers); Lipman, supra note 3, at 471 ("[Lliteracy
limitations are sharply higher among low-income adults." (citing Jeffrey S. Gold,
Proposed IRS Consortium Deal for Return Prep and e-Filing is Flawed, 96 TAX
NOTES 1645 (2002))); see also THE NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2006
OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 34-35 (2007) ("Financial literacy plays an
important role in tax compliance because taxpayers who do not understand basic
financial transactions are unlikely to understand the difference between employee
and independent contractor status or the EITC's complex eligibility rules.").
187. See Jodi Patterson, Making a Noticeable Difference: Presentation to the
Monthly PLAIN Meeting, slides 1-3 (Mar. 9, 2011), available at
www.plainlanguage.gov/news/files/IRSPLAINpresentation.ppt (illustrating issues
with the Service's correspondence).
188. Compare IRS, EITC ELECTRONIC REJECTS, NOTICES AND
CORRESPONDENCES (July 2, 2009) http://www.eitc.irs.gov/rptoolkit/toolsandtips/
eitcnoticeschart/ (associating meanings with electronic reject codes), with IRS,
UNDERSTANDING YOUR IRS NOTICE OR LETTER (July 30, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/O,,id=96199,00.html (displaying the new
forms for correspondence CP-11A, CP-12, and CP-13A along with older forms for
other correspondence).
189. See Patterson, supra note 187, at slide 2.
190. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 6, at 104 (commenting that 42.7% of the study participants "[did not
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percent thought that examination correspondence was difficult to
understand."' The tone of the Service's correspondence is often
overly harsh and legalistic, which tends to frighten taxpayers.'"
The most concerning results of the EITC audit correspondence
study were the conclusions that, after reading the Service's
correspondence, over a quarter did not understand that the
Service was auditing their return, and nearly another quarter did
not understand what documents to send to the Service. ' The
failure to understand the substance of the Service's
correspondence makes it nearly impossible to comply with its
requests.
C. The Service's Phone Issues
Confusing correspondence prompts taxpayers to call the
Service for clarification and assistance. Unfortunately, phone
contact with the Service creates a host of additional issues. In
Fiscal Year 2008, the Service's level of service (LOS) for its toll-
free lines was fifty-three percent." Almost half of taxpayers who
called the Service in FY 2008 were not helped. Since then, the
Service's phone LOS has been "in the low-seventy percent
range."'. The Service's goal is to answer eighty percent of its calls,
and the IRS Oversight Board believes that even getting to the
eighty percent level, where a full twenty percent of taxpayers are
not assisted when they call, will cost another $100 million.'96
The Service's failure to answer the phone when taxpayers
call is a significant issue. An inability to reach the Service to
clarify questions can cause taxpayers to give up, resulting in a
failure to respond to the Service's notices.'" Inaction by an EITC
taxpayer will cause them to lose, in many cases, thousands of
EITC dollars that could be keeping their family out of poverty.
D. Access to Examiners
Correspondence examination cases are only assigned to an
understand some words/terms").
191. Id.
192. See id. (16.4% of study participants agreed that "[tlone of the letter scared
taxpayer").
193. Id.
194. See Olson, Sen. Comm. on Fin., supra note 139, at 2.
195. IRS OvERSIGHT BD., FY 2012, supra note 11, at 21.
196. Id. at 4 ("Achieving this level of service requires both the $23.3 million
increase in FY 2012 to reach the President's policy level and the $81.3 million
initiative in FY 2012 to Improve Taxpayer Service.").
197. See Olson, Sen. Comm. on Fin., supra note 139, at 3.
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examiner after correspondence is received from the taxpayer.1s
Cases in which a written response is not received are worked
completely through an automated audit system.'" The
correspondence examination process is designed to minimize
contact with the Service's personnel, which is how the cost savings
are realized.200 A taxpayer who calls the Service does not
necessarily trigger the Service's filters to be labeled as a
responsive taxpayer, and can find him or herself on the receiving
end of additional correspondence stating that he or she has failed
to contact the Service along with a notice of deficiency.20'
This is a problem when, as a study suggests, ninety percent
of EITC audited taxpayers attempted to contact the Service about
their audit, with nearly seventy-five percent of them calling or
personally visiting the Service.2" As noted above, however, these
are not the actions that get a correspondence case assigned to a
person.203 These EITC claimants are contacting the IRS because
they do not understand the letter, or are having difficulty with the
documents the Service seeks.20
Until very recently, the Service's initial EITC correspondence
did not designate an employee who could be contacted about the
examination. 20' Even now, the correspondence only designates a
supervisor, and callers are routed to any available employee,206
assuming that the call is even answered.'" Evidence has indicated
that the phone line where EITC calls were routed was not
staffed,208 and callers were forced to leave a message.2"0 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that return calls were rarely made from the
198. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slide 13 (on file with author).
199. Id.
200. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 8, at iii.
201. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slide 20 (on file with author).
202. See NA'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 6, at 104.
203. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slide 13 (on file with author).
204. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 6, at 104.
205. See PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, supra note 121, at 2.
206. See Marchbein, supra note 168 ("Correspondence from the IRS bears only
the name of a supervisor. If the practitioner calls the supervisor, the IRS typically
refers the call to whatever employee is available."); see also PROGRESS HAS BEEN
MADE, supra note 121, at 2 ("Practitioners shared that the IRS did not designate, in
the various letters, an employee who could be contacted to further define the issues
or answer taxpayer questions.").
207. See Olson, Sen. Comm. on Fin., supra note 139, at 17 n. 43.
208. See PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, supra note 121, at 2.




E. Document Logging and Matching
Even when EITC claimants understood correspondence or
were able to receive clarification about the documents sought,
forwarding the documents to the Service often made little
difference in the examination.2" Document matching is a serious
problem for the Service.21 ' The Service has significant delays in
mail routing and in reading received mail.212 If mail is not logged
into the Service's system correctly or in a timely fashion, the
automated correspondence system continues actions based on the
belief that the taxpayer has not responded or submitted the
requisite substantiation.2 The Service has admitted that the
premature issuance of statutory notices of deficiency is based on
mail handling problems.215 Although some areas of the Service
utilize barcode correspondence for document matching purposes,
the EITC area in Small Business/Self Employed does not, and has
refused to implement such a provision.216 While the Service claims
to have addressed its mail handling issues,217 this author believes
that problems with logging, matching, and processing
correspondence remain, and result in denial of EITC taxpayer
rights.
F. Studies Show EITC Audit Failure, Not Necessarily
Claimant Failure
Given all of the audit barriers that EITC claimants face,218 it
210. Id.
211. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 6, at 95-96.
212. Id.
213. See Marchbein, supra note 15.
Also, correspondence tends to not be reviewed for several
months, resulting in the IRS' sending letters advising the
taxpayer that it needs additional time to review it. When the
IRS finally issues reports, in some cases the proposed
adjustments are incorrect because it has not properly
considered and evaluated documents and substantiation
furnished by the taxpayer or his or her representatives.
Id.
214. Id.
215. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slide 21 (on file with author).
216. In 2011, SB/SE rejected a Taxpayer Advocacy Panel request to implement a
barcoding system for mail matching and logging purposes. TAXPAYER ADVOCACY
PANEL, 2011 ANNuAL REPORT (on file with author).
217. Id.
218. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS supra
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would not be surprising that EITC claimants who should be
entitled to the EITC are unable to obtain it. In 2004, TAS
published a study2 " in which TAS examined 679 random EITC
audit reconsideration cases.220 Audit reconsideration is a Service
appeals process in which a taxpayer asks to have their
examination reviewed for accuracy."' Between forty percent and
forty-five percent of EITC claimants whose EITC claims were
denied or reduced during the correspondence examination process
received additional EITC upon audit reconsideration.222 In other
words, nearly half of EITC claimants failing the audit process
were in fact eligible for EITC. It follows that being declared
ineligible during the correspondence examination process is not
necessarily indicative of ineligibility. Research from TAS suggests
"that the EITC claims of many taxpayers are denied for lack of
documentation even if they could meet applicable residence and
relationship requirements."22 3
A lack of taxpayer response cannot be viewed as indicative of
a lack of ineligibility either. In the same TAS study, forty-two
percent of the taxpayers were categorized as "late response" or "no
response";... however, nearly half of these taxpayers ultimately
received favorable outcomes.22 5 In other words, the initially non-
responsive taxpayersreceived some amount of EITC. This outcome
rate is comparable to taxpayers who were responsive.226
Extrapolating these findings would cut the alleged improper
payment rate nearly in half.
In 2005, TAS further researched the challenges EITC
claimants face during examination.' This study underscored
many of the findings of the 2004 TAS Audit Reconsideration
Study, particularly that barriers, not necessarily ineligibility,
note 6, at 95-96.
219. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 8.
220. Id. at 9.
221. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 4.13.1.2 (2006) (defining audit
reconsideration).
222. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 8, at 9.
223. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2012 OBJECTIVES, supra note 98,
at 7 (citing Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 10-11).
224. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 8, at 21.
225. Id. at 29.
226. Id. at 27.




inhibit EITC claimants. The 2005 study notes that EITC
claimants often do not understand examination correspondence
nor do they understand what they need to prove during a
correspondence audit to claim EITC.2 " While the study attributes
this to challenging correspondence, the study also notes that the
personal characteristics of some claimants (limited financial and
actual literacy, transient homes) impact EITC accessibility.2 " The
study suggested that "the majority of their clients were truly
eligible for EITC, but ... have difficulty assembling the requested
documentation and just give up, forgoing the credit."230
G. EITC Overpayment Rate is Likely Incorrect
In the 2004 TAS Audit Reconsideration Study, "over forty
percent of all taxpayers with representatives emerged from their
audit with their full EIC intact.""' Another way of looking at this
is that of a subset of 427,807 taxpayers claiming EITC who
received payment and were later audited (the Service would call
these improper payment post-audit), a substantial portion,
perhaps even as many as forty percent, may not have
beenimproper, if they had access to representation during audit.232
Without the extraordinary efforts relating to this study, the
Service would have considered the forty percent in the EITC
improper payment calculation. 23  Taking it a step further, if, as in
the TAS study, forty percent of EITC audits are not improper
payments, and assuming we could translate this to the
overpayment rate, then the EITC annual overpayment rate drops
to between fourteen to seventeen percent.
A potential criticism is that this calculation cannot be
extrapolated because the sample population was arguably a
motivated subset of individuals who felt they were wrongly denied
access to EITC."' Admittedly, this is not a representative sample.
It is nonetheless indicative of the existence of serious, widespread,
and systematic barriers for claiming the EITC."' Even if the forty
percent error rate found for EITC improper payments in the TAS
study cannot be directly applied because of methodological issues,
228. Id. at 1-2.
229. Id. at 5-6.
230. Id. at 2.
231. See NATL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 6, at 96.
232. Id. at 102.
233. Id. at 101-03.
234. Id. at 100-01.
235. Id. at 95.
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it establishes that the twenty-three to twenty-eight percent
improper payment rate is suspect.2 36  The National Taxpayer
Advocate has come to a similar conclusion, stating, "[s]ignificant
statistical questions about the IRS estimates remain."237
The EITC improper payment data is erroneous for other
reasons too. 2 38 First, the rate is based on three studies of EITC
errors that considered a claimant's inability to document EITC as
an overpayment, which (as shown by the TAS study) may "reflect
premature and incorrect judgments."239 Second, the error rate does
not consider underpayments.24' In a February 2011 report, TIGTA
demonstrated that the Service ignores EITC underpayments in its
improper payment calculation, in contravention of the OMB
guidance.2 '1 Additionally, in cases where the incorrect parent may
have claimed EITC, the Service does not research, calculate, or
include the possible underpayment (or lack of payment) to the
appropriate EITC parent.242
The actual rate of EITC improper payments is probably not
nearly as high as the Service reports.243 In addition, several
commentators have discussed the role of unintentional error due
to complexity as a significant contributor to the reported improper
payment rate.24 As Professor Book has stated, "[elven though the
IRS has studied and reported on EITC extensively there is very
little data regarding how much EITC noncompliance relates to
intentional conduct and how much relates to unintentional
error."245
V. Continued Use of Correspondence Examinations
Contravenes Executive Order 13520
The previous four Parts have attempted to explain the
intersection of improper payment law, the earned income tax
credit, and correspondence examinations. The ultimate conclusion
should be obvious: the manner in which the Service uses
correspondence examinations to administer the EITC unduly
236. Id. at 67.
237. See Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 6.
238. See WANCHECK & GREENSTEIN, supra note 97, at 1.
239. Id. at 5-6.
240. Id.
241. See REDUCTION TARGETS, supra note 85, at 14-15.
242. See WANCHECK & GREENSTEIN, supra note 97, at 6.
243. Id. at 5.
244. See Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance, supra note 127, at 1184-86; Book,
Compliance Regime, supra note 5, at 371-72; Holt, supra note 60, at 185-86.
245. Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 60, at 1113.
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burdens access to EITC for many low income taxpayers, and this
undue burden is contrary to Executive Order 13520.24
A critical look at EITC correspondence examinations suggests
that many eligible EITC claimants failduring the correspondence
examination process, albeit not necessarily because of their
ineligibility.2 47  The claimants failures to document EITC
requirements within the narrow confines allowed in the Internal
Revenue Manual are the measurement for EITC improper
payments.
The burden is on the taxpayer to read the voluminous
instructions, determine EITC eligibility (with virtually no Service
assistance), and correspond in writing (with limited telephone
access to Service personnel).2" Executive Order 13520 is clear in
its direction that agencies must minimize improper payments
without unduly burdening program participation. 4 ' The current
use of correspondence examination inhibits lawful EITC
participation.2 o Continued Service use of correspondence
examinations, as undertaken with full automation and nearly no
access to Service personnel for clarification or assistance, to
manage EITC improper payments contravenes Executive Order
13520.
VI. Possible Solutions
The most obvious solution is to simplify eligibility for EITC so
that claiming and verifying EITC eligibility is accessible and
possible for the low-income taxpayers EITC is designed to help.
This, of course, requires congressional action. The current
polarized political climate, as shown by the current struggle
within Congress to agree to any tax compromises and Congress's
decade-long propensity for brinkmanship in tax legislation, limit
hope for this solution. As is typical with tax issues on which
Congress cannot or will not take action, it falls -to the Service to
address the problem.
It is not the intent of this Article to cast the Service as the
246. See Exec. Order No. 13520, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,201-02 (Nov. 20, 2009).
247. See NATL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2004, supra note 8, at 29.
248. See Landsmann, supra note 4, at slides 12-21 (on file with author).
249. See Exec. Order No. 13520, 74 Fed. Reg. 62201 (Nov. 20, 2009) ("Because
this order targets error, waste, fraud, and abuse-not legitimate use of Government
services-efforts to reduce improper payments under this order must protect access
to Federal programs by their intended beneficiaries.").
250. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra




lone villain in the EITC examination story. Service actions are
problematic, but the Service is faced with its own burdens of
revenue collection with a tight budget and antiquated systems
that have not been fully modernized.252 The Service has
periodically undertaken pilots in an attempt to study possible
changes to EITC administration.25 3 Some have been unsuccessful,
but others show promise and, more importantly, reflect the
possibility that the Service is aware of the EITC's examination
undue burden."
A. Precertification Pilot
Given the pressure on the government to reduce
expenditures, it is hard to foresee the Service willingly discarding
its inexpensive (but arguably ineffectual) correspondence
examination process or the minimal staffing it uses with
correspondence examinations."' This realization, that change is
unlikely to emerge on its own, informs the purpose of this Article,
which is to suggest the possibility of a legal catalyst to force
change.
The Service has undertaken certain pilot programs for EITC,
that demonstrate the Service's recognition of the undue burden
that correspondence examinations create for EITC taxpayers.25 6
Just a few years ago, the Service piloted an EITC precertification
program to minimize improper payments.5 Unfortunately,
precertification added another layer of burden for EITC
claimants."' The Service ultimately concluded that, despite a
variety of alternatives, precertification deterred EITC
participation by eligible beneficiaries.259
B. State Data Pilot
In 2010, the Treasury Department began a pilot to assess the
252. See Book, Compliance Regime, supra note 5, at 371-81.
253. Id. at 382-90.
254. See IRS, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT INITIATIVES, supra note 122, at 11.
255. See PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, supra note 121, at 2.
256. Id. at 1-11; see also Partnership Fund for Program Integrity Innovation,




257. EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT INITIATIVES, supra note 122, at 3-4.
258. Id. at 5.
259. Id. at 9 ("Although a 3 percent deterrence rate for eligible claimants might
appear low, this deterrence rate could have broader significance and even conflict
with the IRS goal of increasing EITC participation among the eligible population.").
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ability to use state Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) and TANF data to assist in validating EITC eligibility.260
The pilot has four goals: minimizing improper EITC payments,
advancing efficiency in the administration of the EITC, improving
communications, and reducing barriers to EITC access.' While
the Treasury Department identified claimant privacy and consent
as possible issues to implementation," a bigger concern is that
erroneous state data will create another possible barrier for
claimants and serve as a basis for more audits or improper denials
during audits.262
C. Examiner Contact Pilot
The Service has recently begun two pilots that have much
less risk for harm and also reflect a better understanding of the
burdens of EITC examinations.26' The Service is piloting a
modified correspondence exam process for a selected set of EITC
claimants.' In this study, the National Taxpayer Advocate and
Low Income Taxpayer Clinic directors trained a group of
correspondence examiners who will make personal phone calls to
audited EITC claimants twice during the examination process to
answer questions.266 This pilot is essentially a pilot of a non-
correspondence audit process. Based on previous EITC claimant
success in the TAS Audit Reconsideration Study,267 EITC
claimants likely will have far more success in this pilot than if
they were left to the automated system. Improvement in the EITC
claimant success rate in this pilot would evidence that solely
automated correspondence exams are a bad match for EITC
compliance, and impede access to program benefits. Success in
this study would be evidence that Service personnel personal
involvement is necessary to administer the EITC examination
process.26
260. See Partnership Fund for Program Integrity Innovation, supra note 256, at
1.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 4.
263. Id. at 2.
264. See Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 19-20.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONG., supra
note 6, at 115.




In another pilot, the Service is testing an expansion of the
very limited list of acceptable proof during an EITC
correspondence examination.269 In addition to the list of official
records and select letters on official letterhead, examiners will also
accept third-party affidavit evidence to prove qualifying child
relationship and residency,270 which are two of the largest proof
hurdles. The Service has already concluded, during its
precertification study, that affidavits are "easier for taxpayers to
obtain than official documents or letters" and "had a higher
acceptance rate than the other two types of documents."271 This
study can also help alleviate some of the proof burden for EITC
claimants.
E. Future Possibilities
If expanded for all twenty-six million EITC claimants,272 these
two pilots have the possibility to alleviate some of the burdens of
EITC correspondence examinations: a lack of personal contact
with Service personnel and documentary proof issues. These two
pilots are not, however, a panacea for all of the ills of this process.
They do not address, for example, that establishing eligibility for
the credit is still far too document intensive, the Service's
telephone LOS is likely to remain at abysmally low seventy to
eighty percent levels, or the troublesome document logging and
matching problem. A more looming reality is that, even if these
pilots are successful, the Service is unlikely to secure funding for
the universal expansion of telephone contact for all EITC
examinations.27 The economic and political climates make that
funding very unlikely.274 Without it, the EITC correspondence
examination process will continue as an unfair and undue burden.
Conclusion
Correspondence examinations have proven insurmountable
for many EITC claimants.27 5 According to a TAS study, many
269. Id. at 20.
270. Id.
271. Id. (citing EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT INITIATIVES, supra note 122, at 14).
272. IRS, EITC Statistics, EITC CENTRAL (Dec. 2011),
http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/eitestats/.
273. See Romney, supra note 26, (detailing the failing economy and large
government debt); Bradford, supra note 25.
274. See Romney, supra note 26; Bradford, supra note 25.
275. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
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EITC claimants just give up because proving their eligibility and
navigating the correspondence examination process is too
daunting.276 Such barriers to program participation are precisely
what Executive Order 13520 proscribes in its attempts to limit
improper payments.2 Two current Service pilots, which aim to
expand access to Service personnel during an EITC
correspondence examination and to accept affidavit evidence to
document qualifying children, have promised to lessen the burden
of these audits.2 Unfortunately, the personnel expansion
necessary for examiner contact during all EITC correspondence
examinations is unlikely to receive funding, even if the pilot is
successful.7' Accordingly, it may fall to Executive Order 13520 to
become the necessary legal lever for change.
note 6, at 95.
276. See Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 13-14.
277. See Exec. Order No. 13520, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,201 (Nov. 20, 2009).
278. See Olson, Ways and Means, supra note 63, at 19-20.
279. See Romney, supra note 26; Bradford, supra note 25.
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